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Islamic Support on the Westernization Policy in the Ottoman Empire:  










In this article we dealt with the relations between the state and religion / Islam and its interpreters i.e., 
the ulama, their needs each other. As a case, with an original source, we focused on the time of the Mahmud II 
(1808-1839) The Ottoman reforms of the nineteenth century is reconciliation between Islam and Western civili-
sation. In this process the ulama played key role by commenting Islam accordance with the need of the age or of 
the Ottoman Empire. The reformers, chiefly the Sultan and his close friends needed the support of the ulama to 
legitimate their reform programmes In this crucial stage the head of the ulama the Shaykhulislam, used his own 
religious knowledge and influence, derived from his office by writing a treatise to persuade the masses to accept 
the reforms. Applying the traditional virtue literature on the Ottoman dynasty he presented in this pamphlet one 
of the Western-minded Ottoman sultans as an ideal caliph-sultan. This attitude helped to transform the middle-
aged Ottoman political structure and society into modern ages in Western line.    




Through the Islamic history, the ulama has been divided in response to the politics of 
the governments of the Muslim states. The official ulama (ulama-i resmi), has always been on 
the side of authority, stability and peace. Because of depending on the official salary of in-
come to some extent economically, it has been said that they try to legitimize the policy of the 
authority to persuade the mass founding evidence from the Qur’an in which “the killing - in 
this sense stability or authority- is preferable to the anarchy”. (Qur’an, II/217) The non-official 
ulama (ulama-i gayr-i resmi) who economically independent from the government and have 
not got any official post, have been criticising the policy of Muslim authorities outspokenly. 
Deriving their religious evidence to their political action from the Qur’an “commanding right 
and forbidding wrong both of individual and governmental level” (Qur’an, III/110)   2
 
Since the state and religion needed each other, the two spheres formed an uneasy part-
nership- with the politician holding up the upper hand- to preside over Islamic society. In es-
sence this unwritten contract required the ruler to grant the ulama certain privileges, semi-
autonomous control over judicial and educational institutions, a voice in or a vote over poli-
cies affecting the religious establishment, and a share of country’s wealth - in return for ulama 
support of government. In secure regimes needed ulama cooperation for at least two reasons: 
Firstly of which was the ability of religious leaders to control legitimacy to political ruler. 
Secondly the ulama could serve as intermediaries between rulers and ruled, to calm restive 
elements and to win acceptance for unpopular measures. 
As a rule the political and economic power of the ulama declined in countries where 
the administration succeeded in creating a centralized bureaucracy and secularized system of 
justice and education. Vulnerable or weak regimes invariably protected their flanks by con-
solidating the religious leaders in a variety of ways inter alie: by publicly deferring to their 
elevated social statues, by conferring with them on a regular - if largely ceremonial- basis, by 
participating in Muslim feast-days (Ramadan) and activities, by constructing and endowing 
mosques and religious schools, and especially by avoiding governmental violations of reli-
gious conventions. Even those administrations which had decided upon a policy of Westerni-
zation and secularization such Ottoman Empire tried to work out tactics to retain the ulama’s 
support or at least to naturalise their potential opposition. 
 
I. The Reforms of Mahmud II 
 
The Ottoman Empire embarked quite early on the internal reforms programs inspired 
by European models since the Ottomans had long suffered heavy defeats in the battles against 
enemy. They understood that, militarily, they were behind contemporary Europe. First of all 
the army had to be reformed. Mahmud II (1808-1839) had to carry on the military reforms 
which were initiated by his predecessor. In 1826, with all ranks of ulama behind him, Mah-
mud II eliminated the Janissary corps and organized the new one, the Asâkir-i Mansure-i Mu-
hammadiya.
1 But could not stopped there; he widened his reforms to encompass financial, 
administrative, educational, even social and cultural life. 
To provide financial sources for his reform programme Mahmud, from 1813 onwards 
gradually put all the revenues of all the official and non-official “wakfs” under the care of the 
Awkâf-ı Humayun Nezareti in 1831.
2 By this policy Mahmud also made the `ulema and some 
leaders of the Sufi orders government employees. Mainly for economic purposes, the most 
important and larger iltizams were taken over and administered by a new military treasury, the 
Muqata'at Hazinesi. A similar treasury the Tershane Hazinesi was established to support the 
navy. Some economic burdens were imposed on shops and markets in the form of taxation 
such as the Holy War taxes (the Rusumat-i Jihadiyye).
3
Mahmud II devoted increasing attention to education and opened training centres for 
the new army and the Hassa corps. In this process, despite the strong opposition Mahmud sent 
the first group of 150 students to various European centres such as England, France, Prussia 
and Austria in 1827.
4 The educational reforms to a large extent aimed to create new educated 
elite on Western lines as an alternative to the madrasa-educated elite i.e. the `ulama. 
As for the social reforms, Mahmud started by changing the appearance of the soldiers 
and later that of the civilians. In 1826, the Western tunics and trousers were formally accepted 
as the uniform of the Asâkir-i Mansure.
5 After a period of hesitation among the `ulema and 
some other state dignitaries, in 1828, by the order of the Sultan, the `ulema sanctioned a new 
head-gear, the fez
6 Gradually the Sultan extended the sphere of the clothing reform. In 1829 
an edict of the Sultan imposed regulations concerning the clothing worn by different estates 
within the Empire. According to this edict, with the exception of the `ulema corps, which was   3
 
allowed to keep its traditional dress, fez, frockcoats (jubbe or harvani), trousers, and black 
leather boots became compulsory for all the state employees.
7  
Meanwhile the Ottoman palaces and the houses of the pashas (Pasha Konakları) 
started to be decorated and furnished with European-style furniture.
8 Especially in the social 
life of the upper class state dignitaries the Western social manners and habits began to appear. 
This group started enjoying Western-style entertainment and recreation. In the foreign embas-
sies in the Capital the Ottomans began dancing with ambassadors' wives.
9 The Sultan intro-
duced European protocol for receiving foreign diplomats.
10 By the Sultan's initiative, tradi-
tional Islamic beards were trimmed, even sometimes shaved completely.
11 The European sad-
dles became fashionable and symbols of reverence in the Capital.
12 Before Mahmud's edict, in 
the Empire Monday and Thursday used to be holidays. Now only Thursday was recognised as 
being a holiday by government offices.
13   
Mahmud II improved communications for his centralization policy and propaganda 
campaign. In 1831 the first official Turkish newspaper, the “Takvim-i Vekayi”, was published 
in order to explain “the internal and external affairs of the Exalted State and changes”.
14 Fi-
nally we should mention that in 1832 hanging the Sultan's portrait became compulsory in 
government offices. Despite the fact that, according to the opinion of the majority of the 




II. The Opposition to the Reforms of Mahmud II 
 
It is quite understandable that Mahmud II was in a difficult position. Going beyond a 
defensive military reform programme, by adopting European social and cultural practices, he 
faced strong opposition from different segments of the Ottoman society. First of all the re-
forms threatened, to a certain extent, social, political and economic interest and the status of 
different social strata.  Moreover it brought about ideological arguments in society. Given any 
opportunity the resentful sections were ready to express their anger and concern regarding the 
reforms. For example, as the historian and statement M Nuri Pasha states: "Because of the 
lack of a regular army the Russians won the war, (referring to 1829) and come to Edirne. In 
Istanbul the remaining Janissaries and their disgraced accomplices ascribed this defeat to the 
destruction of the Janissaries and the failure of the new army. Therefore they made anti-
propaganda, even dared to some extent to demonstrate against the authorities in the streets of 
Istanbul"
16
At the beginning of the reform movement, as noted, almost all the ranks of the ulama 
supported the Sultan. However a new stage appeared in the relations between the Sultan and 
the `ulama even before the defeat by Russia in 1829. There were some rumours that some of 
the praying leaders (the imams) and the preachers (the wa'izs) in the army were going to be 
reduced. This policy caused displeasure among particularly the low-ranking `ulama.
17 After 
the war with Russia self-criticism began in the Capital. On the one hand the Sultan and his 
reformist group thought that more reforms were needed to strengthen the army. On the other 
hand the resentful groups believed that the failure of the army was a result of imitating infi-
dels.
18 Moreover, as pointed out earlier, the economic consequences of the confiscation policy 
of the wakfs revenues pushed the low-ranking `ulama onto the side of the opposition. The 
historian Lutfi reports that in 1829 many mosque ministers criticized the reforms in their ser-
mons and speeches in the holy month, Ramadan, so quite a number of `ulama were exiled for 
this reason.
19 In 1829 and 1830 many of the dissatisfied `ulama supported and joined the re-
bels all around the Empire.
20
Parallel to the low-ranking `ulama, the softas (the madrasa students) strongly opposed 
the reform programme. It seems, as Heyd states, that: "Since the studies at the madrasa were   4
 
strictly limited to the traditional subjects of Muslim learning, the softas objected violently to 
European reforms; in all probability they considered them a danger not only to their religious 
beliefs but also to their economic prospects."
21
Another opposing group were the Sufi orders. The Sufi orders did not only suffer and 
object to the reforms from a religious point of view, but also from an economic one.
22 Having 
suppressed the Janissaries, Mahmud, obtained a fatwa which accused the Bektashi Order, the 
spiritual ally of the former, of being heretics and so was able to abolish them.
23 Accusing of 
sympathising with the Bektashi, some `ulama and the elite were sent exile.
24 The Mujaddidi-
yya and the Khalidiyya branch of the Naqshibandiyya Order's emissaries, shaykhs and a num-
ber of its adherents were sent into exile being blamed for forcing the people to join their Or-
der.
25
The Sufis publicly protested the reforms. For instance, in 1929 during a Friday prayer at which the 
Shaykhulislam Abdulwehhab Efendi and the other State dignitaries were present, a strange dervish cursed the 
Shaykhulislam accusing him of influencing the Sultan to adopt false rites.
26 Also a dervish, known as Shaykh 
Sachli, stopped Mahmud on his road and shouted at him: "Infidel Sultan, God will demand an accounting for 
your blasphemy, you are destroying Islam and drawing down upon us the curse of the Prophet."
27
 
III. Islamic Support of the High-ranking `Ulama to the Reforms 
 
The fulfilment of such a Westernisation reform programme was not an easy task to 
achieve in a traditional Islamic society without the participation and support of the ‘ulama. 
Because first of all Mahmud II, as seen, faced with the crisis of legitimacy of his caliphate in 
the eyes of Muslim subjects.  
Winning over the ulama and some segments of the society Mahmud II followed two 
ways. On the one hand he personally and deliberately following a religious policy, built up 
and restored a considerable number of mosques, “wakfs” and “tekkes”, and very often at-
tended Friday prayer, sometimes issued “fermans” calling people to observe their religious 
duties
28, made an Islamic primary education under imams’ mandatory for all children; and 
gave to poor ulama positions as imams in his new army, doubling their salaries when they 
grow restive
29.  
On the other hand Mahmud also seems to have decided to use the legitimate and in-
termediate power of the ulama. Thanks God, the attitude of `ulama towards the reforms were 
largely determined by the realities of their time rather than the ideals of Islam. In the course of 
time and that of political, economic and social developments they generally sanctioned all the 
proposed reforms, quoting some the legal maxims such as “necessity permits what is prohib-
ited”, the “lesser evil”
30 and “public interest necessitates one to act in this way”
31
The ulama also gave constructive response for Mahmut’s direct appeal to his subjects 
by appealing the traditional virtue literature (The Fadhail). For this purpose he ordered some 
prominent ulama to write some books and pamphlets “to enlighten” and even “to warn” the 
“ignorant mass”. From the very beginning, the Ottoman / virtue (fadhail) literature had been 
emerged. In this literature the structure and basic characteristics of the Ottoman Dynasty was 
glorified and exposed. By centralisation on the caliph in these books it was made effort to 
apply to some religious traditional terms for legitimating of the Dynasty. The main objects of 
this literature are to glorify and to legitimate Ottoman Dynasty in the eyes / the judgement of 
the subjects; in other words religion i.e., Islam has been used as a political tool.
32  
For propaganda processes Mahmud ordered the head of the ulama the Shaykhulislam 
to write a treatise in which the theory of obedience and virtue of the Ottoman dynasty would 
be explained in the terms of the virtue literature.
33 Responding to this order the Shaykhulis-
lam Sayyid Yasincizade Abdulwahhab Efendi introduced his theory by collecting twenty-five 
hadith with some comments under the title of Khulastu’l-Bayan fi ‘itaati’s-Sultan.
34 The date 
of publishing of the treatise 1247/1831 is very important, because the Sultan’s authority was   5
 
under threat of the opposition. It seems that on completion, the treatise distributed within the 
Capital as well as the main centres of the Empire.
35  
It seems that Abdulwahhab’s treatise made a considerable contribution to institute the 
theory of obedience to the caliph-sultan in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. The ar-
guments of Abdulwahhab appeared again in the time of Abdulhamid II (1876-1909).
36  
There is no doubt that, to a large extent, the theory of obedience was exploited by 
autocratic regimes through the Islamic history. In both cases i.e. the reigns of Mahmud II and 
Abdulhamid II, the Empire and the authority of the sultans were threatened by internal and 
external events. They, therefore, wanted to tighten their position and pull the Empire together. 
In Mahmud's centralization policy and Abdulhamid's pan-Islamic policy such theory was des-
perately needed to persuade the people to obey their caliph-sultan and to stand by them. The 
two sultans wanted to be recognized as caliphs by their subjects. 
 
IV. Making a Westernized Reformer Caliph-Sultan 
 
1. The Necessity of a Ruler 
 
Abdulwahhab, for supporting the centralization policy, started to establish necessity of 
a ruler, and then moves to prove Mahmud's fitness for the position of ruler; finally he came to 
a conclusion that it is a religious obligation to obey such a Muslim ruler i.e. the Caliph-Sultan 
and his orders, referring to his reforms. 
Abdulwahhab opens his argument concerning the necessity of a ruler with the medie-
val Islamic theory. According to this theory, human beings are social or political beings (ha-
yavan-i madani) and must co-operate in order to meet each other's requirements. Al-Ghazali 
(d. 505/1111) took the same argument stating that “men had to live in a society; and were 
exposed to quarrels and conflict. They therefore, needed a principle of power (sultan) to guide 
them and to arbitrate in their disputes. Such a principle required a norm (qanun) to enable 
differences to be solved and decisions based on law to be imposed.”
37
The Shaykhulislam accepts the same argument stating that “human beings are in need 
of solidarity and co-operation between each other, because every one has different abilities in 
issues of livelihood and continuation of life in many ways.”
38  This statement reflects “the 
idea of different crafts”, which was explained by al-Razi (d. 606/1209), such as agriculture for 
producing food, weaving for making clothing, building for creating houses and politics for 
arranging, in an orderly manner, human affairs.
39
Abdulwahhab carries on his argument as follows: 
"Existence of this solidarity depends solely on civilization (tamaddun)
40 and human 
society. But the character of the human race is different; particularly, ordinary people 
lean towards evil (sharr) and depravity (fesad). This, therefore, causes depravity and 
disorder (fesad anu khalal) in the social order within a short time. This means the sus-
pension of God's ordinances (ahkâm) concerning the 'umrân of the world
41 and exis-
tence of mankind for a while. It is therefore necessary for some defined general prin-
ciples (`usul kulliye) for this world and the hereafter to maintain the continuity of the 
human race and civilization of the world. For this reason God has sent the Messen-
gers and revealed the Books to give order to the world and to the human race, and for 
the welfare of mankind. He has put down ordinances (ahkâm): instructions (awâmir) 
and restrictions (zawâjir) concerning the human affairs and fixed punishments 
(hudud) for the crimes of oppressors (zalims) and sinners (fasiqs) and clarified lawful 
(halal) and unlawful (haram) in accordance with the rules of wisdom (al-hikam) on 
behalf of all creatures and in conformity with the necessity of time and aptitude 
(isti`dad, in Turkish text mesalih).'
42  6
 
It could be said at this stage that the Shaykhulislam was trying to set up a base for 
making a reformer or renewer caliph-sultan by emphasizing the conformity of the “ahkâm” to 
contemporary conditions and human welfare. As will be recalled it has often been repeated by 
Islamic jurists that “ahkâm will undeniably change in the course of time.”
43 This legal maxim 
appeared almost three decades later in the collection of civil codes of the Empire the Ma-
jalla.
44
Abdulwahhab continues his explanation: “Consequently Allah has authorized a just 
caliph of the Ottoman Dynasty (Al-i Osman) to implement the fixed punishments, the admin-
istrative issues (siyasa) and the obligation of “jihad” for the sake of Allah to raise His word 
until the last day.”
45
In medieval Islamic political thought although no doubt about the necessity of a ruler, 
there is a dispute as to whether reason or revealed law dictates the necessity. The jurists hold 
the idea that it is the shari`that dictates the necessity of a ruler whereas Muslim philosophers 
justify this idea via the use of reasoning. According to the former one the shari'a has to be 
implemented by one who is divinely authorized to enforce its ordinances. The Qur'an also 
indicates that: “Obey God and His Messenger and those in authority among you.” (IV/59) 
Obedience is, therefore, divinely imposed upon believers. And then it is clear that they are 
imams.
46 The jurists, therefore, insisted on the necessity of imamate by the Divine: the imam-
ate is established to replace prophecy in the defence of faith and administration of the world. 
In the light of this explanation without any doubt Abdulwahhab accepts the argument of the jurists stat-
ing that “God has delegated caliphs to implement the ordinances, administrative affairs and the obligation of 
jihad.”
47 On the same matter he quoted a saying of the Prophet: “Religion and (temporal) power (sultan) are 
twins, therefore, religion is the foundation and the sultan is guardian; without the foundation the sultan is torn 
down and without the sultan the religion will be destroyed.”
48
 
2. The Making Mahmud II an Ideal Ottoman Caliph-Sultan 
 
a. The Titles of Mahmud II 
 
Having established the basis for the necessity of a ruler, Abdulwahhab moves to the 
next step to establish the Caliph-Sultan as acceptable to the shari'a and to call the masses to 
obey him. In his address to Mahmud II Abdulwahhab combines the traditional Turkic-Persian 
titles with Islamic ones, on the same lines as the Ottoman dynastic theory, which was devel-
oped and completed by the mid-sixteenth century.
49 He adheres to a rather formal and tradi-
tional style of presentation, listing the Sultan's titles as follows:
50 1. “sultanu’l-ghuzât va’l-
mujahidin” (the sultan of fighters on behalf of Islam), 2. “khalifetu’l-haliqa fi’d-devrân” (the 
caliph for the creatures of all times), 3. “emiru’l-mu’minin” (the head of believers), 4. 
“imamu’l-muslimin” (the leader of Muslims), 5. “munawwiru eriketi’l-khılafa” (the illumina-
tor of the Caliphate throne), 6. “muzayyinu seriri’s-saltana” (the embellisher of the throne of 
the power), 7. “afkhâmu’l-khawâqin” (the most illustrious of khaqans), 8. “zill Allahi fi’l-ard” 
(the shadow of God on the earth), 9. “sahipkıran” (the lord of a fortunate conjunction), 10. 
“mujaddidu’l-erkâni’l-dawla” (renewer of the state’s pillars), 11. “sâhibu’l-shawkah” (the lord 
of the might), 12. “hâfizu’l-bilâd” (the guardian of the lands), 13. “nâsiru’l-ibâd” (the helper / 
ally of the creatures), 14. “‘azamu salâtini’l-ard” (the biggest sultan of the world), 15. 
“ghawsu’l-Islam wa’l-muslimin” (the helper of Islam and Muslims), 16. “suratu’l-amn wa’l-
aman” (the aspect of security and protection), 17. “mahdi-i akhir zaman” (the saviour of the 
last time). 
It is useful to focus on some of them.  
Ghâzi: As the Shaykhulislam states the Sultan is the Sultan of the “guzzat” (p. of 
ghazi) who wages “jihad” or “ghaza” for the sake of Islam. From the early years, the Ottoman 
Sultans considered themselves leaders of a religious war (ghaza) against infidels.
51 The foun-  7
 
dation of the Ottoman state on the border with Byzantium emerged this idea gave a particular 
force and immediacy. As known The Holy Law, in fact, makes jihad against non-Muslims an 
obligation on the Islamic community. In waging war on Christians, the Ottoman sultans ful-
filled the command of God, the duty of ghaza, and this idea gave legitimacy to their rule and a 
raison d'etre to the state itself.
52 It could be considered that by emphasizing the ghaza idea 
Shaykhulislam tries to give the Muslim subjects, who suffered form defeats in the battlefields 
before enemy, self-confidence that Mahmud is the sultan of the ghuzat who wages war against 
the infidels victoriously. 
Khalifa: In the treatise Mahmud is titled “Khalifetu’l-haliqa fi’d-devran” (the caliph 
for the creatures of all times), “emiru’l-mu’minin” (the head of believers), “imamu’l-
muslimin” (the leader of Muslims) and “munawwiru eriketi’l-khılafa” (the illuminator of the 
Caliphate throne). It is obvious in the Khulasa that Mahmud II is the caliph of all Muslims 
and sat on the throne of “al-khilafat al-kubra”,
53 a phrase which is generally only used in con-
nection with the first four caliphs of the Prophet by some strict jurists. The emphasis on the 
caliphate of the Sultan is the main theme of the treatise. In this crucial time Ibnu’l-Annabi 
also emphasized the right caliphate of Mahmud II more or less by the same arguments.
54
When the Ottomans reached their hay-days by the sixteenth century, as head of a Mus-
lim state, the sultans required spiritual and divine approval and developed the theory of the 
Ottoman Caliphate.
55 The Grand Wazir Lütfi Pasha who was the key person in this process, 
composed a treatise in 1541 called Khalasu’l-Ümme fi Marifeti’l-Eimme firmly defined and 
established the caliphate of the Ottoman Sultans, denying the classical theory of the Quraysh 
origin, with some religious arguments.
56  
After the war with Russia (1768-74) the treaty of Kuchuk Kaynarja named the Otto-
man Sultan as Caliph asserting the religious authority of the caliph over the Tatars in the Cri-
mea. From this time onwards the practice of sultans of adopting the title “caliph” became very 
frequent in order to exert religious influence upon their Muslim subjects and to be used as a 
political weapon against rebels within the Empire. As the case of Mehmed Ali of Egypt indi-
cates, the Muslim rebels seem to have had some religious and political arguments to justify 
their actions against the caliph-sultan. Mehmed Ali's son Ibrahim Pasha, after invading Syria 
in 1831, decided to march into Anatolia. But before doing that he got a fatwa from the mufti 
of Aleppo to depose the caliph. By spreading such a fatwa inside Anatolia and Istanbul he 
hoped to effect the deposition of the Caliph by a popular revolt.
57 One of the reasons to em-
phasis on Mahmud's rightful claim to the Caliphate was a response to this development. 
With connection to the title caliph, Abdulwahhab addresses Mahmud II as “zill Allah 
zıllullahi fi’l-ard” (the shadow of God on the earth), a phrase which appears in the sayings of 
the Prophet.
58 This title had been used by Muslim rulers from the beginning of Islam barrow-
ing form the Sasanid political tradition to claim that the ruler is supported and sanctioned by 
God in all his actions. In the Ottoman virtue literature zıll Allah attributed the Sultans.
59 It is 
quite understandable why Mahmud was addressed by this title. As will be remembered the 
people in the Capital started insulting Mahmud, accusing him of being an “infidel sultan” 
(Gavur sultan). This title gave the message that he was still within Islam and the Shadow of 
God. Whatever comes from him also comes from God.  All these reforms are, therefore, in 
accordance with the will of God. 
Mahdi: Mahmud was called with the title “Mahdi”, reflecting the popular eschatologi-
cal belief that a Muslim saviour will appear at the end of time.
60 In the Ottoman history Mah-
mud was not the first sultan who bore this title, before him, for example, Selim I was de-
scribed as Saviour of the later times, “Mahdi-i Akhir zaman”.
61 It is most probably the idea of 
Mahdi was introduced in the Ottoman virtue literature by Abdurrahman el-Bistami el-Hurufi 
(d. 1454) in his pamphlet Miftahu’l-Cifri’l-Cami.
62 It is known that the Ottoman state had 
been suffering from a series of defeats since the 1760s and there was an expectation of the   8
 
“Mahdi” who would save the Empire. The idea was even common among the bureaucrats and 
military officers.
63 The public, therefore, was ready to accept such a saviour. At this stage, by 
attempting to modernize his army in order to restore Muslims’ pride against infidels, Mahmud 
was a good candidate for being presented as an expected “Mahdi on the horizons of the Em-
pire. 
Mujaddid: One of the titles of Maumud in treatise is the “Mujaddidu’l-erkani’l-dawla” 
(renewer of the state’s pillars). With regard to the idea of “mujaddid”, “renewer” a saying of 
the Prophet in Abu Dawud's collection indicates that “At the beginning of each century God 
Most High will send to the Muslim community someone who will renew its faith and sover-
eignty.” (Sünen-Melahim 1) In the Ottoman history it was claimed that the some Ottoman 
sultans are renewer of its century. Lütfi Pasha referred this hadith to glorify the Ottoman Dy-
nasty. He assumed that the most recent “renewers of the faith”, the Ottoman Sultans: At the 
beginning of the eighth Islamic century Osman Bey had restored Islam after the conquests of 
the pagan Mongols; at the beginning of the ninth, Mehmed I (1413-1421) had revived the 
faith after the destructions of Timur; and at the beginning of the tenth, Selim I (1512-1520) 
had defeated the Safavid infidel, Shah Isma'il, and upheld the shari'ah.
64 According to M. 
Es'ad, apart from those mentioned above, Sultan Mahmud is the “mujaddid” of the laws of 
Islam by  virtue of renewing matters relating to religion, the Imperial council (Divan), the 
Scribe (Kalemiya) and the army (Sayfiya) at the beginning of the thirteenth century Hijri.
65 
There is no doubt that Mahmud was the renewer of the laws of Islam (mujaddid-al-kawanin 
al-Islam) and of the pillar of the state (al-arkan al-dawlah).
66 Here again the title aimed to 
respond to the public resentment against the reforms; that is to say, Mahmud cleared the way 
for a new path for the Ottoman State by renewing the old Ottoman system. 
The titles of Mahmud II represent the heroic and honorific epithets traditionally as-
cribed to the Ottoman dynasty, even though the political and military situation of the Empire 
made it impossible for him to fulfil the promise of these titles. However this tendency has 
been continuous in the Middle East, even though it has declined very sharply for the last two 
centuries. Small and local successes, even military coups, made the Middle Eastern rulers 
heroes and saviours of the ummah and encouraged them to bear such titles. It was particularly 
common during the wars of independence directed at  Western colonialism  for almost all  the 
rulers in the Middle East to be called by Islamic-nationalist titles, such as “qaid-i `azam” (the 
exalted leader), “za`im al-ummah” (the leader of ummah), in spite of their humiliating cir-
cumstances. 
Despite some traditional Turkic titles in the treatise one would not claim that Abdulwahhab was appeal-
ing to the nationalist sentiments of the Turkish population of the Empire. Because at the beginning of the nine-
teenth century, although nationalist movements started among the non-Muslim millets in the Balkans, national-
ism had still not gained any ground among the Muslims in the Empire. Islam was the only means of keeping the 
Muslim subjects together. Therefore it would not be wise to play on such sentiments in order to invite Muslims 
to obey their universal caliph-sultan. 
 
b. The Personal Qualifications of Mahmud II 
 
As far as the qualifications of the caliph are concerned, the well-known sunni political 
theory of al-Mawardi (d.450/1058) states that the Caliph must be just ('adil) in his dealings 
among his subjects; have religious knowledge ('ilm) to exercise the independent reasoning 
(ijtihad); be brave and courageous (najdah and shaja'ah) to protect the Islamic territories and 
wage 'jihad' on non-believers; be able to hear, see and talk perfectly and must not have any 
physical disabilities; be broad-minded regarding the administration of the state; and finally be  
a member of the Quraysh tribe of Arabs.
67
In the Ottoman political experience, the fundamental qualification for the Sultans was 
the individual's worthiness to fill the position. The Ottomans believed that simple succession   9
 
proved that the Sultan was worthy of the crown; however, the Sultan may grow old, feeble, or 
corrupt and thus lose his worthiness to serve as Sultan. Following this orthodox Sunni line 
Abdulwahhab presented Mahmud II as an almost perfect ruler i.e. the caliph-sultan to the sub-
ject.
68  
1. In physical and spiritual aspects Mahmud is perfect. He is unequalled / unique 
(adimu’l-misal), and his creation is in the excellent form of the human race with all perfec-
tions (fitrat’u’l-`aliya wa kamalatu’l-insaniyya). 
2. Mahmud has a perfect intelligent. He is bewildering minds (muhayyiru’l-ukul) and 
the level of his intelligent in science and spiritual knowledge is unique (mertebe-i aklı ilm u 
irfanda sabık-ı fazail-i ula). His miraculous orders and decrees are accordance with canonical 
text i.e. Qur’an and reason (emir wa irade-i kerametleri muvafık-i menkul wa makul) 
3. Mahmud has good intention. His good intention is the enlivening the religion and 
executing the Prophetic tradition (niyet-i hayriyeleri ıhya-ı din wa icra-yı sünnet) and his most 
important thoughts and cares is the security and order of the poor and subjects (ehem-i efkarı 
wa endisheleri amn u asayish-i fukara wa raiyya) 
4. Mahmud’s wishes is justice and equity, and organising the army of the jihad, im-
proving of the lands, and comfort of creatures (muradları adl u dad wa tanzim-i cünd-i cihad 
ile imar-i bilad ve eriha-i ibad) and his just politics is improving and prosperity of the Umma 
(siyaset-i adliyesi müsltezim-i salah ve falah-i umma). The quality of ‘adl became almost in-
separable from Mahmud II, and he was accorded the title “’adlî”.
69 A number of the institu-
tions were entitled by “’adlî” (referring to Mahmud II) such as the Divan-ı Ahkâm-ı Adliyya 
(the Council of Juridical Enactments) and the Mekteb-i Maarif-i Adliyya (the School of Edu-
cation). In Islamic tradition, “justice” has been regarded as one of the most important qualifi-
cations and aims of a Muslim ruler as in the Ottoman one. It is claimed that Mahmud person-
ally protected his people from the excesses of government, such as predatory taxation and the 
corruption of local officials. For the Ottomans, the ruler could only guarantee this justice if he 
had absolute power. For if he was not an absolute ruler that meant that he would be dependent 
on others and so subject to corruption. Absolute authority, then, was at the service of building 
a just government and laws rather than elevating the ruler above the law as Europeans have 
interpreted the Sultanate. In order to ensure adalet, the  Ottomans  set up a number of prac-
tices and institutions in the central government surrounding the Sultan. In the Ottoman Em-
pire it was accepted theoretically that the fundament of the state / power is justice (Mülkün 
temeli adalettir).
70  
It seems that the emphasis on the justice here was intended to persuade the public. As 
pointed out, Mahmud confiscated “wakfs” and “timars” and the lands of the “ayans” and 
“derebeys” and moreover changed the status of the classes within the Ottoman society.  This 
policy might have caused the feeling that these people were treated unjustly, and that Mah-
mud II, therefore, was an unjust ruler.  
5. Mahmud has religious and spiritual knowledge (‘ilim wa ‘irfan). Mahmud’s 'ilm en-
ables him to exercise independent reasoning (ijtihad). In the contemporary literature he was 
praised as “mujtahid”.
71 “'Irfan” in the Sufi tradition indicates semi-divine knowledge, so it is 
superior to “'ilm”. According to this tradition “’irfan” cannot be formally studied but was 
taught by God or a spiritual teacher (murshid). If someone attains “'irfan” he becomes “'arif” 
(agnostic).
72 Mahmud II was frequently presented as a spiritual Sufi leader with miracles 
(karamah).
73 The aim of this literature seems to have been to persuade the disciples of the 
Sufi Orders of the acceptability of Mahmud's reforms. 
6. Mahmud has the wisdom of Plato (hikmat-i Eflatun). Mahmud II is a man who 
knows the wisdom of Plato
74 The Platonic political legacy expressed in Plato's Republic and 
Laws, and Aristotle's Niccomachean Ethics was introduced into the Islamic environment by 
Muslim philosophers such as al-Farabi (d. 958), Ibn Sina (Avicenna) (d. 1037) and Ibn Rushd   10
 
(Averros) (d. 1198), who modified and then adopted it.
75
As head of a state based on Islam, Mahmud II initiated a reform movement on the 
Western lines. Therefore it is quite understandable why the concept “the wisdom of Plato” 
was added to his qualifications. It seems that he wanted to be seen as a ruler who knew the 
wisdom of Plato, one of the important formative elements of Western civilization which, to 
some extent, he wanted to adopt. Although Abdulwahhab adds two more elements i.e. `irfan 
and hikmah al-Eflatun to the jurists' theory he is still within the bounds of Islamic political 
thought.  
Now the Shaykhulislam presented Mahmud II as the ruler fit for his own time.  
 
c. The Duties of the Caliph-Sultan 
 
Within the realm of administration the main duties of the caliph were stated especially 
by theologians. In al-Balqillani’s (d.404/1013) statement the duties of the “imam” are to de-
fend the ummah against its enemies; to enforce the fixed punishments (hudud) of the shari'a; 
to restrain oppression and redress grievances; to divide the revenues (fay' and zakah) among 
Muslims, and to make the pilgrimage safe.
76 Al-Mawardi develops this statement adding the 
following ones: to undertake jihad; to fix stipends (ataya); to seek out trusted persons; and 
appoint advisers; to oversee affairs personally and carefully; and finally to protect the ummah 
from disorder and sinfulness.
77
In the Ottoman political literature almost all these main duties were applied to the ca-
liph-sultan. For example, the Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Pasha (d.1129/1717) writes in his 
Nasa`ih al-Wuzera that: "He (imam) should make affluent the condition of the governed (ter-
fih-i ahwal al-ra'aya); carry out the injunctions of the illustrious holy law (ijra-i ahkam-i 
sharif gharra); protect the boundaries of the territory of the Muslims (sadd thughur-i inha wa 
ijra): and delegate some of his functions to a wise vizier such as to protect the poor and to 
take care of the state affairs."
78
Abdulwahhab follows the same line giving a long list of the duties of the caliph, which 
he generally mentions as the aims of the sultan, as follows:  
1. to enforce the fixed punishments (iqama al-hudud),  
2. to revive religion and perform the sunnah (ihya al-din wa ijra al-sunnah,  
3.  to provide comfort for the poor and the subjects (rahat al-fuqara wa al- 'ibad),  
4. to serve religion and the state (hidmat al-din wa al-dawlah),  
5. to provide security for the re'aya (amn al-ra'aya), 
 6. to reorganize the army of jihad (tanzim jund al-jihad),  
7.  to provide goodness for the millah and salvation for the ummah,  
8.  to undertake the administration of the state (tadbir al-mulkiyya), 
9. to enforce siyasa (iqama al-siyasa)”
79
Here, three concepts need explanation: “dawlah”, “tadbir” and “siyasa”. The concept 
dawlah”, basically means to turn, to alternate. In the course of centuries the concept had addi-
tional meanings of “dominion”, “state” and “realm”, a ruler's kingdom such as “Dawlat-i Os-
maniyya” referring to the house of Osman.
80 Throughout the nineteenth century it seems that 
all these meanings were used. However, at the end of the nineteenth century, the meaning of 
“dawlah” was fixed as “state”. In this process the Sened-i Ittifaq of 1808 has been regarded as 
one of the important steps in separating “state” from ruler by some contemporary historians 
such as N. Berkes.
81 It was considered that the Sened did not mention the sultan in term of 
being a party but only “dawlah”.
82
It seems that in the treatise on the one hand the dependence of the state on the sultan 
was indicated in the phrase “the axis of your personality means religion and state” (kutb-u zat-
i shawkatlari medar-i din u dawlah) .
83 On the other hand the separation of state and sultan   11
 
was described in such a way as “the body of state founds a new soul with the new military 
and administrative kanuns” (jism al-dawlah wajada ruhan jadidan bi tajdid al-gawanin 
al`askariyya ve bi ihya al-usul al-mulkiyya)
84
The term “tadbir” means organization, management, regulation and administration in 
Islamic political thought. In this sense al-Baqillani states that “tadbiru’l-jaysh” (the organiza-
tion of the army) is among the duties of the imam.
85 Al-Mawardi also declares that the caliph 
must know the “tadbir”,
86 that is to say, the issue of administration.  
As for the concept “siyasa” it refers in the political literature to the management of 
human affairs. In Islamic law, “ta`zir” (discretionary chastisement) was described as “al-
siyasatu’l-shariyya”.
87 In the Ottoman context, according to U. Heyd “siyasa”, “in its widest 
sense it seems to denote “punishment” in general, which may include strokes and punishment. 
As a technical term, however, it generally means either execution or severe corporal punish-
ment or both.” He also states that “it refers to a punishment inflicted in accordance with the 
shari`a as well as one decreed by the “kanun”. Also penalties not in conformity with the 
shari'a and inflicted by secular authorities are often said to be carried out siyaseten, i.e. “as an 
administrative punishment.”
88 In this sense Abdulwahhab uses a phrase “by committing the 
crime of disobedience some people deserve the wrath of God and the punishment of the Padi-
shah” (siyasat-i padishahiyya)
89  for the groups which oppose the reforms. 
 
3. The Theory of Obedience to the Caliph-Sultan 
 
It is clear that throughout Islamic history only a few caliphs fulfilled the conditions 
demanded by the political theorists. What would be the way out for them under these circum-
stances? Al-Ghazali's response demonstrates the `ulama’s attitude: 
"There are those who hold that the imamate is dead, lacking as it does the required 
qualifications. But no substitute can be found for it. What then? Are we to give up 
obeying the law? Shall we dismiss the kadis, declare all authority to be valueless, 
cease marrying and pronounce the acts of those in high places to  be invalid at all 
points, leaving the populace to live in sinfulness? Or shall we continue as we are, rec-
ognizing that the imamate really exists and that all acts of the administration are 
valid, given the circumstances of the case and the necessities of the actual moment?"
90
In general the majority of the jurists preferred any kind of stable authority to civil 
strife (fitna) in order to preserve the unity of the ummah. They demanded obedience to the 
ruler from all subjects, whether or not he fulfilled the required conditions. To legitimize their 
arguments they quoted generally the following verses from the Qur'an: 'Rebellion (fitna) is 
greater (more dangerous) than murder (qatl) '(II/217) and 'Allah forbids all shameful deeds, 
unjustice and rebellion (baghy)' (XVI/90).
91
A quite considerable number of traditions enshrining the duty of obedience to a Mus-
lim ruler were put into circulation. Abdulwahhab collected and interpreted twenty-five of 
these sorts of tradition which were used for the same purpose by previous jurists.  Some of 
them, for example, appeared in “Kitab al-Kharaj” attributed to Abu Yusuf (d. 179/798). The 
most well-circulated among them is that “Fear God and obey Him and even if a flat-nosed, 
shrunken-headed Abyssinian slave is invested with power over you, hearken to him and obey 
him”
92  Another very common one is this: “He who obeys God obeys me and he who obeys 
the imam obeys me; he who rebels against me rebels against God, and he who rebels against 
the imam rebels against me”
93 Another typical example is that “If the imam is just, then re-
ward is due to him and gratitude from you, if he is tyrannical then the burden of sin is his and 
it is yours to be patient”
94
From the translations of some of these hadiths into Turkish, interpreted by Abdul-
wahhab in the treatise, it seems that there is some appeal to the Islamic sentiment of the peo-  12
 
ple rather than Turkish-Persian one. For instance he translated “sultan” as “padishah-ı Islam” 
or “imamu’l-muslimin” and “zill Allah” as the “shadow of God”.
95 It seems that this inclina-
tion in the translation and the interpretation was designed to to respond to the religious criti-
cism and concern about the institution of the caliphate and its decrees. 
Having introduced these hadiths the Shayhulislam went a step further to getting sanc-
tions from the Qur'an in order to legitimize the obedience to the present caliph-sultan. He 
quoted a well-known verse of the Qur'an, as mentioned above “Obey God, obey the Messen-
ger and obey those in authority among you” (IV/59) adding that “according to the `ulama of 
religion “ulu’l-amr” means the caliph of Islam.”
96
For the same purpose he provides some sayings from the Sufi traditions saying that 
'Ibn Arabi (d. 6381240) states that if the sultan is “kamil” (perfect in personality and charac-
ter) he is the pole of the world (kutb); if he is “gayr-i salih” (non-perfect) he is the saint (bedel 
sg. of abdal)”. Abdulwahhab declares without any hesitation that “Thank God our Sultan is 
the greatest Sultan (al-Sultan al-`Azam); he is the pole of the time (kutb al-zaman)”
97
The Shaykhulislam continues to glorify the Ottoman dynasty by quoting the sayings of 
the Prophet and the Sufis. He includes the following hadith, which appears in the collections 
of al-Bukhari and Abu Dawud, in his argument “here will be a group of people among my 
ummah who are in the right path”. He comments that “a group of people” means, according to 
the researchers, “the house of Osman”.
98 Another hadith which appears in Ibn Hanbel's Mus-
nad is that “Verily Constantinople will be conquered, the commander of this conquest is the 
best commander and the army is the best army”. There is no doubt that Constantinople was 
conquered by the house of Osman. These two hadiths show, says Abdulwahhab, the virtue 
and continuity of the Ottoman State.
99
He includes some Sufi comments on the following verse of the Qur'an “And verily we 
have written in the Scripture (the Psalms of David), after the Reminder, My righteous slaves 
will inherit the earth” (XXI/105). Here, Abdulgani al-Nablusi made a comment saying “that it 
is a sign from the Qur'an about the sultans of the Ottoman dynasty; the words “`ibad al-
salihin” refer to the house of Osman.” The shaykh Salah al-Din Safadi and Imam Yahya b. 
`Aqb, most probably another two Sufis, comment that “the Ottoman Sultans are the most 
righteous sultans and the most virtuous after the Companions of the Prophet.”
 100
After interpreting the verses, the hadiths and the comments of Sufis concerning the 
obedience to the sultan and their glory, the Shaykhulislam came to the conclusion that “all 
these hadiths demonstrate the obedience imposed upon every believer to the imam of Mus-
lims; even if the sultan is tyrannical (jabir) or sinful (jair)”
101
“It has been proved from hadiths, the Qur'an and the Sufi writings”, says Abdul-
wahhab, “that the shari`an arranged divine ordinances to affairs of religion and of the world. 
To obey its performer, therefore, is an obligation upon Muslims. According to reason and the 
canonical texts it is also obligatory to keep on praying about the life of the Sultan and his 
dawlah”
102 Moreover having reminded his people that the ancestors of the Sultan conquered 
the lands and countries and enlightened them with the light of monotheisms and the faith of 
Islam. The Shaykhulislam states that “this also gives the sultan a right to demand obedience 
from his subjects.”
103
It is clear that Mahmud II was presented as a traditional Muslim caliph-sultan in terms 
of titles, duties and qualifications. The reason could be: either the `ulama still saw him as a 
traditional Muslim leader; or Mahmud wanted to be presented in this way; or, public opinion 
was not ready to see or accept any leader except for the caliph-sultan. It seems that the last 
statement has some grounds in the Capital. As recalled, some groups demonstrated their dis-
approval at any kind of change in social, military and political life as well as in the appear-
ance of the sultan. Furthermore, logically, only a Muslim caliph-sultan could demand obedi-
ence from his Muslim subjects.    13
 
The Shaykhulislam Sayyid Yasincizade Abdulwahhab Efendi used some accusations 
against the opposition groups calling them the common people (awam-ı nas), because of igno-
rance and of forgetfulness and probably of weakness of faith. Firstly they don’t know the af-
fairs of the world (umur-ı dünya) and the rights of the caliph (hukuk-ı halife), that is to say his 
legislative power and the demand of obedience from his subjects. Secondly they are not un-
aware the public interest of the country (mesalih-i dawla). Fourthly, therefore, they are caus-
ing civil strife, disorder and rebellion (fitna, fasad and bagha)
104
The Ottomans inherited a rich mixture of political traditions from vastly disparate ethnic groups: Turks, 
Persians, Mongols, Mesopotamian and, of course, Islam. The Ottoman state, like the Turkish, Mongol, and 




It could be said religion i.e., Islam and the state supported each other in the Ottoman 
Empire. The Shaykhulislam made a reformer caliph-sultan in Western line with Islamic and 
traditional values, since Mahmud II extremely was in need of such a support. Beyond any 
doubt, the reformers of the time of Mahmud, to a large extent, faced a traditional medieval 
Muslim society and empire. The problem was to transfer this medieval empire into modern 
times. In this respect the `ulama were the vital element in executing such a policy. The best 
way for the Sultan and his reform-minded men was, first of all in one way or another to per-
suade the `ulama and acquire their approval about any reform. As a next step the `ulama 
would convince Muslim society. 
Let us ask the following question: Was there any alternative ideology or system to the 
`ulamas’ interpretation of the sacred texts, say, in the sixteenth century Ottoman Empire? It is 
very unlikely. First of all, at that time it was almost impossible to suggest an alternative to 
Islam which could be imitated and followed by the sultan and the state dignitaries. Islam was 
superior to all the systems of the world in the eyes of the Ottomans. It was highly unlikely 
that any elite group in Istanbul would be willing to follow Europe. But, although it had started 
before, at the end of the eighteenth century the picture clearly changed. By experience the 
Ottomans were well aware of the fact that Europe was in every aspect superior to the Ottoman 
Empire. Furthermore there was an elite group with whom the Head of the Empire wanted to 
secure the Empire by strengthening itself militarily and in other areas by adopting European 
practices. They believed that the only way to prevent the Empire from declining was to follow 
the European examples. 
Under these circumstances the Shaykhulislam as a head of the `ulama was in a diffi-
cult position. It seems that he had to make a historical decision concerning the survival of the 
Ottoman Empire, whether to survive in modern times by participating in the process of Euro-
peanization or whether to turn back to the past and defend its legacy. The Shaykhulislam at 
this point chose the first option, and tried to catch up and to control the political, social and 
intellectual developments, which had become inevitable. He and the top official ulama did 
this as far as possible within the scope of Islam, by participating in the policy-making and 
justifying decisions in Islamic maxims. 
If we consider that the aim of the reform policy was to adopt the economic, military 
and administrative practices of Europe into an Islamic society it became easy to understand 
the mind of `ulama towards the reform movement. One could say that in this process of adop-
tion the `ulamas' main concern, as the representatives of Islamic civilization, was to soften the 
impact of this new civilization and to present it as complying with the needs of modern times.  
From the Tanzimat period onwards this became a task for the `ulama. In this respect the Ot-
toman `ulama of the nineteenth century were no longer offensive but defensive. 
Furthermore the `ulama might have realized that the internal weakening of their corps 
make it impossible for them to resist such a policy. Additionally it could be speculate that the   14
 
high ranking `ulama of this time with short-sighted did not realize the Westernization reforms 
eventually destroy the Islamic nature of the Ottoman State and society.  
It could be said that as in the Ottoman Westernization processes, Islam is still strong 
enough and can play a constructive role in modern Turkey’s efforts to join EU, as mean of 
legitimating of reform programs in the eyes of Turkish public.  
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